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Note
Commonwealth v. Richman: A State's Extension
of Procedural Rights Beyond Supreme Court
Requirements
Historically, state courts have regarded the constitutional deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court as the limits beyond
which they cannot favor the interests of the state over the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants. The converse situation, where
the state court decides for various reasons that a more encompassing
standard of individual protection should prevail in the state than
that required by the Supreme Court, has occurred less frequently.
With Supreme Court decisions now tending to emphasize the inter-
ests of society and to downplay the borderline interests of the crimi-
nal defendants, a state court may find itself more frequently inquir-
ing into the feasibility of establishing a higher standard of individ-
ual protection within the state. This note will concern itself gener-
ally with the adjudicatory tools available to the state court that
desires to chisel out a more demanding state criminal procedure.
More specifically, by concentrating on a recent Pennsylvania deci-
sion, Commonwealth v. Richman,' this note will seek to illustrate
those various methods available to judicially establish a higher de-
gree of individual protection within the state. In Richman, the
Pennsylvania court was confronted with the dilemma of maintain-
ing an established standard pertaining to the right to counsel at
pretrial indentification confrontations.
THE NEED FOR MORE THAN THE MINIMUM
The United States Supreme Court first ruled on the constitution-
ality of pretrial confrontations conducted in the absence of counsel
in United States v. Wade' and its companion case, Gilbert v.
California.3 The lineup identification in Wade occurred before trial
1. 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
2. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3. Id. at 263.
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but after indictment. While denying petitioner Wade's contention
that the involuntary lineup accompanied by compulsory voice iden-
tification violated his protection against self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment,4 the Court agreed that the lineup violated his
sixth amendment rights.' The Court therein recognized that the
sixth amendment guaranteed the right to counsel at any critical
stage in the prosecution where the suspect's right to a fair trial
might be derogated;6 and because of its inherent prejudicial poten-
tial, a post-indictment lineup was deemed to be such a "critical
stage." 7 The Court held that the great likelihood of substantial
prejudice required in-court identifications to be excluded unless
based upon means sufficiently independent of the tainted lineup.'
The Wade Court was clearly concerned that certain kinds of
pretrial procedures would endanger the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment rights. Furthermore, the "critical stage" analysis em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in Wade did not appear to be limited
to confrontations occurring after indictment. However, Kirby v.
Illinois,9 decided five years later, refused to extend the Wade-
Gilbert exclusionary rule to a confrontation occurring before any
4. Id. at 221.
5. Id. at 236-37.
6. In the language of the Wade majority:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the presence
of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected
by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether
potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confron-
tation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.
Id. at 227
7. The Wade Court broadly defined what it meant by "critical stage":
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the
pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence
of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at
trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical
stage of the prosecution at which he was "as much entitled to such aid [of counsel]
• ..as at the trial itself."
Id. at 236-37 (footnote and citations omitted).
8. Id. at 241.
9. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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"adversary judicial proceeding" had been initiated against the sus-
pect. The Court reasoned that before that time, no right to the sixth
amendment's protections had accrued.' 0 The confrontation in Kirby
had occurred after formal arrest but before any other criminal pro-
ceeding had begun. Within the reasoning of the Kirby Court, arrest,
or at least arrest per se, was not considered to be the initiation of
adversary proceedings which called into action the protections of
the sixth amendment. The Court in Kirby retreated from the lan-
guage and rationale of Wade. The switch in analysis from the nature
of the confrontation to the time at which the confrontation took
place would not have been predictable from the Wade decision." In
fact, many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, had followed the
Wade rationale without mentioning the significance of the proce-
dural development of the investigation.'"
Prior to Kirby, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had been
willing to apply the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule to any post-
arrest, pretrial confrontation, with the exception of on-the-scene
identifications.' 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had first held
that certain pretrial confrontations would be subject to the Wade-
Gilbert rule in Commonwealth v. Whiting." In that case, the victim
10. The Kirby Court suggested a few starting points of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings-'"formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment." Id. at 689. Since Kirby was concerned with striking an appropriate balance between
the right of an individual to be free from prejudicial confrontation and the interest of society
in the prompt and efficient investigation of crime, the accused's right to fair treatment before
adversary judicial proceedings commenced could comfortably be protected by the due process
standard set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See 406 U.S. at 691.
11. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); Commonwealth v. Richman, 320
A.2d 351, 358 (Pa. 1974) (Eagen, J., concurring); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 156 (1972); Note, Preindictment Confrontations, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 98 (1973).
12. E.g., Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooper,
356 Mass. 74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968);
Stewart v. State, 458 P.2d 646 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442
Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970);
Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
13. The on-the-scene exception finds support in dictum by Justice Nix in the principal
case, Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 354 n.5 (Pa. 1974), and in Commonwealth
v. Dickerson, 226 Pa. Super. 425, 313 A.2d 337 (1973). See generally Commonwealth v. Hall,
217 Pa. Super. 218, 269 A.2d 352 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Ray, 455 Pa. 43, 315 A.2d
634 (1974).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first noted Kirby in Commonwealth v. Ray, supra, but
since the identification confrontation in that case was of the on-the-scene variety and was
made before any formal arrest, the court had no difficulty agreeing that the confrontation
occurred before the "initiation of adversary judicial proceedings" and thus no sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had yet accrued. Id. at 49, 315 A.2d at 636.
14. 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
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identified the defendant by means of a photographic lineup" one
hour after the defendant's arrest, and the following day identified
the defendant through a one-way mirror. 8 Following what it per-
ceived to be the Wade rationale, the court in Whiting concerned
itself more with the nature of the confrontation which requires the
presence of counsel than with the time at which the right to counsel
attaches for pretrial identifications. 7 The court reasoned that since
in both instances a substantial potential for improper influence or
suggestion might be present, both confrontations were critical
stages requiring counsel." Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Spencer,"
the Pennsylvania court summarily applied the Wade rationale to a
confrontation occurring after arrest, but before any other adversary
proceeding. 0 Since Kirby was to later hold that there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel at a lineup merely because it had
occurred after arrest, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had "un-
knowingly" granted the criminal defendant a higher standard of
procedural protection than would ultimately be required by the
United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.
The facts presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth v. Richman2 ultimately provided the vehicle for
resolving this disparity between state and federal standards. At 9:30
a.m. on May 6, 1970, Leroy Richman was arrested2 without a war-
rant and taken to the 9th District Central Detective Division in the
City of Philadelphia. 21 After signing a written waiver of counsel, and
15. The police showed the victim eight photographs, one of which was the defendant
without eye glasses. After the victim selected the suspect's picture, she was shown another
photograph of the defendant, this time with eye glasses (her assailant had worn eye glasses).
She again identified the defendant as her assailant. Id. at 207, 266 A.2d at 739.
16. Id.
17. However, the court did expressly note that the identifications were post-arrest con-
frontations by italicizing the word "after" while discussing when the picture-lineup occurred.
Id. at 207, 266 A.2d at 739.
18. Id. at 208, 266 A.2d at 739-40.
19. 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
20. Id. at 331, 275 A.2d at 301.
21. 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
22. Richman was arrested in connection with the rape of Elina Taber and the burglary of
her apartment. The alleged burglary and rape had occurred five days earlier, on May 1, 1970.
Brief for Appellee at 2, 3, Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellee].
23. Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351, 352 (Pa. 1974).
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about four hours after his arrest, he was placed in a six-man lineup"'
where the complaining witness identified him as her assailant. 5 At
the trial, that witness again identified the appellant without refer-
ence to the previous lineup. Richman was found guilty of burglary
and rape; post-trial motions were denied on a finding that appellant
waived any possible right to counsel; and the superior court af-
firmed, per curiam. 8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted
allocatur, limiting the issue to "whether there was a constitutional
right to counsel at a preindictment lineup, and if so, whether that
right was intelligently waived in this case."
THE PENNSYLVANIA SOLUTION
The Richman court was confronted with the conflict between
Kirby's holding that no sixth amendment right to counsel accrued
upon arrest, and the Pennsylvania requirement for counsel at any
post-arrest lineup. The court's least involved option would have
been to adopt Kirby's suggestion that counsel is only required at
lineups conducted in Pennsylvania occurring after information, in-
dictment, or the like, 2s though this position would have meant over-
24. The lineup consisted of a cross-section of people similar in appearance to the
description given to the police by the victim, that is, the six men in the lineup were
all black, in addition to the defendant, at least two others had bush hair cuts, the group
ranged in height from 5'9 to 6', and none had beards.
Trial Court Finding of Fact Number 5 on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Lineup, as
contained in Brief for Appellant, Exhibit "A", Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
25. 320 A.2d at 352.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. It is clear that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not wish to retreat to a strict
reading of Kirby by requiring that counsel need not be present unless criminal process had
been initiated by "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). A number of state court decisions which
have been handed down since Kirby may be read to stand for the proposition that the quoted
list is exclusive. See Houston v. State, 49 Ala. App. 403, 272 So. 2d 610 (1973); People v.
Chojnacky, 8 Cal. 3d 759, 505 P.2d 1402, 106 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1973); State v. Jackson, 199 N.W.
2d 102 (Iowa 1973); Jackson v. State, 17 Md. App. 167, 300 A.2d 430 (1973) (offense report of
police officer is not "formal charge"); Stewart v. State, 509 P.2d 1402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)
(preliminary information is "formal charge"); State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d
873 (1973).
Had the Pennsylvania court decided it best to follow this line of cases interpreting Kirby,
it would have meant overruling the Whiting and Spencer cases to the extent they held
otherwise. The court instead chose to maintain the higher standard of individual protection
which those cases had established.
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ruling Commonwealth v. Whiting 9 and Commonwealth v. Spencer0
to some extent. Even a cursory reading of the Richman opinion,
however, will indicate that the Pennsylvania court was concerned
with maintaining the state's more demanding "right to counsel"
standard.
The court accomplished this goal by using a process which might
be labeled "judicial interpretation,"3' focusing on the broader
phraseology in Kirby12 and applying an interpretation of that lan-
guage to the local criminal processes. Within the framework of this
process of "judicial interpretation," the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania rejected the appellant's argument" and adopted its own "in-
terpretational solution." Justice Nix, speaking for the majority,34
commenced with an endorsement of the strong policy behind the
exclusionary rule announced in Wade," but noted that the opinion
there did not specify exactly when the right to counsel attaches.
That task, the court conceded, had been left to Kirby. However, the
majority felt that Kirby had not established an all inclusive rule;
the line to be drawn would depend upon the particular procedures
which were employed by each state. 7 The determinative issue was
"whether this lineup preceded the 'initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings' as defined in Pennsylvania.
' 3
29. 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
30. 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
31. The "judicial interpretation" phrase is employed as a shorthand reference to the wide
spectrum of judicial analyses which construe, apply and distinguish a case which would
appear to control the matter at hand rather than directly apply its holding.
32. In interpreting a Supreme Court decision, a state court may grab hold of a catch
phrase in the case more conducive to a broader interpretation. In Richman, the phrase from
Kirby that properly caught the court's eye was the "initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings." 320 A.2d at 353.
33. The appellant argued that under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings takes place at the preliminary arraign-
ment. Under Pennsylvania criminal procedure, he argued, the arrested suspect must be given
a preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay, even though the procedure varies
slightly depending upon whether the arrest is made with or without a warrant. The appellant
then argued that the distinction in Kirby is irrational when applied to this procedure; neces-
sary delay should not include time for identification confrontations. See Brief for Appellant
at 6-7; PA. R. CifM. P. 122, 130.
34. He was joined by Justices O'Brien, Roberts, and Manderino. 320 A.2d at 352, 355.
35. Justice Nix cited a quote from Wade. Id. at 352. See note 7 supra.
36. 320 A.2d at 352.
37. Id. at 353.
38. Id.
The majority of the court labeled the time at which a magistrate
approves a written complaint as the "initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings" since in Pennsylvania that stage is "at least as signifi-
cant as the indictment" in determining the formation of adversary
positions and the strength of the government's decision to prose-
cute. " The court then analyzed the circumstances under which such
approval is given during the normal state criminal process in order
to determine exactly when the right to counsel attaches. In Pennsyl-
vania, magisterial approval of a complaint occurs on one of two
alternative occasions: either at the time of the issuance of an arrest
warrant," or, where an arrest is made without a warrant, at the
preliminary arraignment." If the Pennsylvania court would have
gone no further in its analysis of Kirby, it is clear that the time at
which the suspect's right to counsel at pretrial confrontations would
attach would depend upon the type of arrest. A suspect arrested
with a warrant would have a right to counsel at the point of his
arrest,42 whereas such right to counsel would not attach until the
preliminary arraignment if he were arrested without a warrant.
Realizing the predicament that its analysis had created, the
Pennsylvania court unveiled two policy reasons for not so distin-
guishing the two types of arrests. First, since warrantless arrests are
justified only in the face of compelling exigent circumstances, 3 al-
lowing uncounseled lineups between warrantless arrests and initial
presentments could only encourage abuse of the exigent circumstan-
ces exception and undercut the strong policy requiring warrants
39. Id.
40. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 3(i), 102, 130.
41. In Pennsylvania, the initial presentment is termed "preliminary arraignment." See
PA. R. CraM. P. 130.
42. 320 A.2d at 353. A strict reading of the test for the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings proposed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would demand a right to
counsel at any post-issuance confrontation, with the noted exception of on-the-scene confron-
tations. Though the situation would be rare where a right to counsel would be asserted after
the warrant is issued but before it is served, it is within the realm of possibility. Suppose after
a complaint had been filed and a warrant issued, the suspect, aware that he is suspected of
the crime, turns himself in so that he may be exculpated by the witnesses to the crime. Before
the warrant is served or he is otherwise formally arrested, he executes an invalid waiver of
counsel and submits to a lineup where he is "identified" by the witnesses as the criminal.
The majority in Richman would undoubtedly hold that the suspect never had a right to
counsel at this lineup since he had not yet been formally arrested; yet they would be forced
to admit that the confrontation had occurred after the initiation of adversary judicial pro-
ceedings in Pennsylvania as they had defined the term.
43. 320 A.2d at 354, citing generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Note1975
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whenever possible." Secondly, the distinction would conflict with
the policy behind rule 1301 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which requires that a suspect arrested without a warrant
be taken "without unnecessary delay" before the proper authority
for an immediate preliminary arraignment. The court noted that
the unnecessary delay phrase was designed to permit delays only for
routine police procedures such as booking, photographing, finger-
printing and other common administrative procedures," and argued
that to include a lineup within that category would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the rule.47
The court chose to eliminate the unwise distinction between the
two types of arrests by further stretching its interpretation of Kirby;
it declared that Kirby only requires the states to limit the Wade rule
requiring counsel where the limitation would benefit the interest of
society in the prompt and efficient investigation of unsolved crime.48
In other situations the right to counsel should attach at the last
stage in the investigative process before the initiation of "adversary
criminal proceedings," after which no real benefit to society could
accrue. The application of this conditional reading of Kirby estab-
lished a right to counsel for the suspect arrested without a warrant
which was coextensive with the rights granted other suspects. Under
established Pennsylvania criminal procedure," an investigative pro-
ceeding between arrest and preliminary arraignment would be con-
sidered an "unnecessary delay." Thus, no valid benefit could accrue
to society after a warrantless arrest, and the right to counsel should
attach at the time the suspect is arrested.'
44. 320 A.2d at 354.
45. PA. R. CaM. P. 130 provides:
When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant in a court case, he shall be
taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority where a complaint
shall be filed against him and he shall be given an immediate preliminary arraignment.
46. 320 A.2d at 354, citing Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
47. 320 A.2d at 354.
48. Id. at 353.
49. PA. R. CraM. P. 130.
50. The court went on to hold that Richman had not executed a valid waiver of counsel
form; that is, that his waiver was not "knowing and intelligent" since at the time of signing
he had not even been informed of the general nature of the crime for which he was being held
suspect. 320 A.2d at 355.
The court then remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of whether the
in-court identification of Richman had a sufficient basis independent of the uncounseled
lineup as required by Wade. 320 A.2d 351, 355 (Pa. 1974).
Vol. 13: 577
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The federal constitutional analysis employed by the Richman
court has two major weaknesses that leave it prone to potential
Supreme Court review." First, the court's holding that a magis-
trate's approval of a complaint is the initiation of "adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings" would have been more persuasive if it
had been based upon some distinct aspect of established Pennsyl-
vania criminal procedure, or if the court had at least delineated
some reasons for its choice. In the absence of any special justifica-
tion, that determination is highly questionable, for as Justice Eagen
noted in his concurring opinion, the overwhelming weight of author-
ity has not been so broad in the interpretation of the phrase "ad-
versary judicial criminal proceedings. 52 Secondly, the Richman
majority held that Kirby only works to limit the Wade rule when
the limitation would benefit society in the prompt and efficient
investigation of unsolved crime. The validity of this interpretation
is equally questionable."
The Richman court could have authored a sounder opinion and
avoided the problems of its conditional reading of Kirby by deter-
mining the preliminary arraignment to be the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings. The Kirby Court had suggested focus-
ing on the point at which the defendant "finds himself faced with
the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."54 A look at
the established procedures in Pennsylvania which surround the ini-
tial present/ient, or preliminary arraignment, indicates the requi-
51. Ever since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the Supreme
Court has recognized its authority to review state court decisions that have arisen under the
Federal Constitution. In fact, it would be interesting to conjecture how the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania would have interpreted its own decision on remand had the state prosecutor
appealed to the Supreme Court. Despite the "interpretive" analysis, should the state court
be faced with the alternatives of being overruled by the Supreme Court as a matter of federal
constitutional law or retreating to the stand that the decision was one of "state supervisory
power," it is suggested that the latter would be chosen. A similar problem arose in Common-
wealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), and is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 80-83 infra.
52. 320 A.2d at 360 nn.3 & 4 (Eagen, J., concurring).
53. The United States Supreme Court in Kirby decided to draw a definite line for the
attachment of the right to counsel at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings
regardless of the potential benefit to society in the prompt and efficient investigation of
unsolved crime. The holding of Kirby could be more accurately described as a delineation of
the exact time when the explicit guarantees of the sixth amendment, including the right to
counsel, are applicable. That is, before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, no
such rights can be said to attach. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
54. Id. at 689.
1975
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site gelling of such adversary positions. At the preliminary arraign-
ment the suspect is served for the first time with a copy of the
complaint by a magistrate or other "issuing authority."55 He must
be informed of his right to secure counsel or be assigned counsel
prior to his preliminary hearing, which, unless waived, must be
within three to ten days. 6 If the offense is bailable, the suspect may
post bail, and be set free; otherwise, he must be committed to jail
according to law. 51 Considering these procedures, the Pennsylvania
court would have been more reasonable in concluding that the pre-
liminary arraignment was the initiation of adversary judicial crimi-
nal proceedings in Pennyslvania. Admittedly, by itself, such a de-
termination would not have maintained the same standard of indi-
vidual protection as had Whiting and Spencer, but it would have
preserved the highest federal constitutional right of protection con-
sistent with the actual holding of Kirby.58
THE "STATE LAW" SOLUTION
A sound alternative to the interpretational solution chosen by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court with its attendant difficulties would
have been the establishment of a higher degree of procedural protec-
tion solely as a matter of state law. Conceptually, this "state law"
solution would seem the easier and more appropriate way to estab-
lish a higher standard of individual protection within the state. As
mentioned previously, the interpretational method -used by the
Richman court leaves that decision open to potential Supreme
Court review, but no such review can follow a "state law" decision,
since it is naturally based on an adequate and independent non-
55. PA. R. CrIM. P. 3(i), 140.
56. Id. 140.
57. Id.
58. Whether or not other considerations might effectively raise that standard of protection
in Pennsylvania is another question, for Pennsylvania law recently provided that the time
passing between arrest and preliminary arraignment cannot be used for anything other than
routine administrative procedures. When a defendant has been arrested, he must be taken
without unnecessary delay before the proper authority for a preliminary arraignment. See PA.
R. CalM. P. 122, 123, 130.
The meaning of the term "unnecessary delay" has been repeatedly defined to include delay
only for recognized administrative practices. See Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311
A.2d 613 (1973); Commonwealth v. Wayman, 454 Pa. 79, 309 A.2d 784 (1973); Commonwealth
v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547, 307 A.2d 238 (1973); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d
701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
In Futch, the Pennsylvania court held that all evidence obtained during an unnecessary
Vol. 13: 577
federal ground. 5 Furthermore, since the choice to create the higher
standard of protection necessarily implies dissatisfaction with the
federal minimum, there could be no more appropriate way to ex-
press that dissatisfaction than to reject the minimum standard and
establish the higher standard independently, as a matter of state
law.
A complete rejection of Kirby on state grounds could have been
legally supported." The Richman court could wisely have declared
that the broad language and policy of Wade reached soundly beyond
the facts of that case to encompass any pretrial confrontation, and
therefore, Kirby was an unreasonable and unwise restriction of that
language and policy." Had the court in that way disregarded the
federal standard embodied in Kirby, a reasoned choice from among
several state law alternatives would have been necessary.
At least three such alternatives were available to extend the state
right to counsel to any post-arrest lineup. The first two of these
solutions stem from the Judiciary Article of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania. 2 That article confers upon the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania the general power to supervise all courts and officers
of court, and to prescribe rules of procedure for the judiciary system
subject to the limitation that rulings so authorized do not enlarge
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 3 The same article
delay between arrest and preliminary arraignment would be excluded from court except that
which had no reasonable relation to the delay whatsoever; included in the former category
would be in-court identifications based on uncounseled lineups, unless they had a clear and
independent basis. Thus, if the Richman court had decided that the preliminary arraignment
was the Kirby "initiation," counsel would be required at that point and under the Futch
rationale, no lineups could be permitted during the time between arrest and preliminary
arraignment.
One may wonder why appellant Richman did not propose a Futch argument. Unfortun-
ately, Richman had been tried in 1970 and had argued his cause before the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in 1971; Futch was not handed down until 1972. Not having timely made a
Futch unnecessary delay argument, Richman could not raise it in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Additionally, since Futch had not been decided when Richman was arrested,
the Pennsylvania court could not take judicial notice of the decision.
59. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
60. Kirby has been variously criticized. See, e.g., Steele, Kirby v. Illinois: Counsel at
Lineups, 9 CRIM. L. BuLL. 49 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAnv. L. Rev. 1,
156 (1972); Note, Preindictment Confrontations, 2 Am. J. CrmM. L. 98 (1973); Comment,
Kirby v. Illinois: A New Approach to the Right to Counsel, 58 IOWA L. Rev. 404 (1972); Note,
Counsel at Lineups, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 630 (1973).
61. This was substantially the position of Justice Eagen, concurring, in the principal case.
He was joined by Chief Justice Jones. 320 A.2d at 358.
62. PA. CONST. art. 5.
63. PA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 10(a), (c), provide in relevant part:
Note1975
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also gives statutory effect to such rulings by suspending existing
laws which are inconsistent with them.4
Under such authorization, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
could have established a right to counsel at post-arrest confronta-
tions by the formal adoption of a Rule of Criminal Procedure. Such
rules are usually submitted to the court by the Criminal Procedural
Rules Committee appointed by the supreme court under article 5,
§ 10(c) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and are adopted by a
formal order of court." Though this power is normally employed to
promote the efficient administration of the state judiciary," the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will adopt a rule governing procedure
in a criminal trial when the defendant's interest deserves protection
but does not achieve the status of a constitutionally protected
right. 7
In Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle," the appellant con-
tended that in order to assure a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
guilty plea, the court ought to require an on-the-record colloquy
between the judge and the defendant detailing the explanation of
the consequences of such a plea. 9 Although the court did find merit
in the suggestion of such an on-the-record examination by the trial
judge, it did not feel that it was constitutionally required, and de-
clined to adopt any such rule in the case before it.7o Interestingly
(a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative au-
thority over all the courts and justices of the peace ....
(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts [and] justices of the peace . . .
including the power to provide for. . . the administration of all courts and supervision
of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution
and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor
affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or
justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation of repose. All laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under
these provisions.
64. Id. § 10(c).
65. Adoption or amendment of these rules can be found regularly in the forward pages of
the Pennsylvania State Reports. See, e.g., In Re: Order Amending Rule 319(a) of The Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 432 Pa. xxxii (1968).
66. See 10 P.L.E. Courts § 52 (1970).
67. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 451 Pa. 505, 304 A.2d 124 (1973); cf. Commonwealth
v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 272-73, 304 A.2d 432, 448 (1973) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
68. 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968).
69. Id. at 103-05, 237 A.2d at 196-98, citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487
(1962).
70. 428 Pa. at 105-07, 237 A.2d at 197-98.
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enough, less than ten months after the date of the West decision,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, pursuant to its procedural rule-
making power,7 adopted and promulgated an amended rule 319
providing that a judge shall not accept a plea of guilty unless, by
an inquiry appearing on the record, the judge determines that the
plea was voluntarily and understandingly made." Though the su-
preme court had declined to assist the appellant West, it had in this
way provided guidance for later defendants.
3
Had the Richman court desired to use the West approach, it
would have had to conclude that the presence of counsel at a post-
arrest lineup was demanded only on behalf of the efficient adminis-
tration of justice and not by the Federal Constitution. In light of the
justices' continued support for Wade and its progeny in Pennsyl-
vania, such a stance would have been highly improbable.74 In addi-
tion, the West approach could not have aided appellant Richman
or others whose confrontations occurred under similar circumstan-
ces before the rule in question had been formally adopted. A rule of
criminal procedure, being in the nature of legislation75 which does
not affect substantive rights,76 is given effect from some prospective
date or the date of adoption." It is suggested that the Richman
court was concerned enough about the proper disposition of the
71. PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 10(c).
72. In Re: Order Amending Rule 319(a) of The Rules of Criminal Procedure, 432 Pa. xxxii
(1968). The following comment accompanied the revised version of rule 319(a):
The purpose in amending Rule 319 is to codify the requirement that the judge, on the
record, ascertain from the defendant that the guilty plea is voluntarily and under-
standingly made. Recent Court decisions have indicated that this is the preferred
practice but have not made the requirement mandatory. See Commonwealth ex rel.
West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968).
73. In Re: Order Amending Rule 319(a) of The Rules of Criminal Procedure, 432 Pa. xxxii
(1968). The amended version of rule 319 was adopted on November 25, 1968 and became
effective February 3, 1969.
74. An accession to the position that the Federal Constitution does not require counsel at
post-arrest lineups would have implicitly overruled Whiting and Spencer since those cases
had held that Wade requires counsel at lineups which occur after arrest only. Moreover, there
is a strong hint in the Richman majority opinion that the justices felt that a constitutional
interest was involved.
75. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
77. E.g., In Re: Order Adopting Rules of Criminal Procedure 2001 to 2004, Inclusive, 451
Pa. xxvi (1973) (all effective sixty days from date of adoption); In Re: Order Adopting Rules
of Criminal Procedure 175 to 185, Inclusive, 447 Pa. xxxi (1972) (all effective immediately
upon adoption). But cf. Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 21, 275 A.2d 332 (1971), where the
supreme court implied that the requirement of an on-the-record examination of the
defendant's understanding of his plea of guilty as suggested by Commonwealth ex rel. West
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case at hand78 that the rule adoption solution was concededly in-
appropriate.
The second state law alternative which was available to the Penn-
sylvania court in Richman was adjudication by way of the court's
supervisory power. Although analogous to the court's authority to
adopt rules of procedure, the supervisory power is more extensive,
since it enables the court to establish a higher standard of proce-
dural protection via ad hoc adjudication." An interesting and analo-
gous application of the supervisory power was made by the court in
Commonwealth v. Campana.'° In the original Campana decision,
the plurality opinion discussed the issue at hand primarily in terms
of federal constitutional protections, establishing a double jeopardy
standard more demanding than that ever required by the decisions
of the Supreme Court.8" A petition for writ of certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for a determination of whether the original
v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968), and as adopted by amended rule 319(a) ten
months later would be effective from the date of the West decision.
78. As stated in note 58 supra, the supreme court could have used the combination of the
Kirby constitutional right (preliminary arraignment is the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings) and the Futch rule (no unnecessary delay between arrest and preliminary ar-
raignment) to establish a right to counsel for post-arrest confrontations, but that would not
have aided Richman. Similarly, the court could not have chosen the strict rule adoption route
discussed in the text, since Richman would not have benefited.
79. Justice Eagen noted this in his concurring opinion in Richman. 320 A.2d at 361, citing
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304
A.2d 432 (1973), "and cases cited therein." Justice Eagen was probably referring to the cases
cited in Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974) (per curiam addendum
opinion).
80. 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, vacated sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Campana, 414 U.S. 808
(1973), on remand sub nom. Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854 (1974)
(per curiam addendum opinion).
81. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Manderino
and O'Brien, held that the fifth amendment required compulsory joinder of all charges arising
from a "single criminal episode." The plurality noted that the most recent Supreme Court
authority, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), had discussed the double jeopardy clause
in terms of the "same evidence" test, and had held that collateral estoppel applied in subse-
quent criminal prosecutions to bar the relitigation of ultimate issues of fact resolved in favor
of the defendant in an earlier prosecution. Nevertheless, the court felt that Ashe had only
incorporated the concept of collateral estoppel as a minimum double jeopardy protection.
Whether or not that provision barred successive prosecutions arising from a single transaction
was still an open question. 452 Pa. at 239-55, 304 A.2d at 434-41.
Justice Nix, concurring, would have supported the "single episode" test by requiring com-
pulsory joinder of all known crimes based on the same conduct, but did not feel that such a
standard was constitutionally mandated. Id. at 260-63, 304 A.2d at 449-51 (Nix, J., concur-
ring).
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decision was based on federal or state grounds.8 2 Surprisingly, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in its per curiam addendum opinion,
held that since additional reasoning, over and above the constitu-
tional rationale, had been employed as a basis for the original opin-
ion, it should be viewed as state law established pursuant to the
broad supervisory power invested in the courtYm
Clearly, the Pennsylvania court has shown its willingness to es-
tablish such a higher standard of individual protection by use of its
broad supervisory powers when there appear to be obstacles to the
establishment of that standard by an interpretation of federal con-
stitutional requirements. Actually, where non-constitutional rights
are involved, the supervisory power solution is probably the most
attractive. Justice Pomeroy strongly advocated this approach in the
Richman case. Although he felt that, under Kirby, the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings in Pennsylvania occurred at the pre-
liminary hearing," he noted that the court need not limit the Penn-
sylvania requirements to those minimum standards required by the
Justice Eagen and Chief Justice Jones concurred in the result reached by the plurality, but
would have espoused a different double jeopardy standard. They felt that fifth amendment
double jeopardy required joinder in all crimes which flow from continuous conduct directed
to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective. A second prosecution, however, may
obtain where the purpose of the crime charged is "to prevent a substantially different harm
or evil." Id. at 256-60, 304 A.2d at 451-53 (Eagen, J., concurring).
Justice Pomeroy did not disagree with the principle behind the single criminal episode
standard, but argued that such a constitutionally based option had already been foreclosed
by the decisions of the Supreme Court. He suggested a state procedure whereby the defendant
would have the power to opt for joinder of all crimes arising from the same transaction. Id.
at 263-75, 304 A.2d at 443-49 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Though a majority of the court
favored the single transaction test, there was no agreement as to its basis.
82. Pennsylvania v. Campana, 414 U.S. 808 (1973). In addition to the difficulty in deter-
mining a prevailing rationale, the plurality opinion had contained some inconclusive discus-
sion of similar multiple offense provisions in the Constitution of Pennsylvania. 452 Pa. at 243-
45, 304 A.2d at 436-37.
83. 455 Pa. at 624-26, 314 A.2d at 855-56. The only explanation for this sudden change in
focus would appear to be aversion to Supreme Court review; Justice Pomeroy felt that the
court was consciously avoiding the potential confrontation. See 455 Pa. at 631, 314 A.2d at
859 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
The Campana case evidences one "difficulty" that occurs when a state court purports to
decide a case on federal constitutional grounds: the possibility that the state attorney general
might petition the United States Supreme Court for a review of the case. That is exactly what
happened in Campana; the state sought a determination that the state court's decision was
erroneous. However, since the Supreme Court will not review a state court decision when it
is based on an adequate and independent non-federal ground, see California v. Krivda, 409
U.S. 33 (1972), it remanded for a determination of what grounds the case was decided upon.
84. Justice Pomeroy conceded that another tenable position was that the preliminary
arraignment was such initiation. 320 A.2d at 357 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
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Federal Constitution. 5 Justice Pomeroy thought that two alterna-
tives were available: adoption of a supervisory rule, or adjudication
as a matter of state constitutional law. In choosing the supervisory
ruling, he expressed the court's well-founded reluctance to decide an
issue on constitutional grounds when disposition might be made on
some other adequate basis."8 Additionally, a supervisory ruling
would be a more flexible means of dealing with the problem in
Richman, where the endeavor was to strike the appropriate balance
between fairness to the individual suspect and the interest of society
in the prompt and efficient investigation of crime. 7
Such a supervisory power solution could have established the
broader state right to counsel in an eminently acceptable manner.
Justice Eagen and Chief Justice Jones, who were vocal critics of
Kirby in the Richman case, stated that they would have supported
the creation of a state right to counsel as a matter of supervisory
ruling.8 The majority's refusal to implement this attractive and
persuasive alternative would seem to imply a conviction that the
right to counsel at post-arrest lineups should be preserved by a
constitutional guarantee.
Conveniently, the third alternative potentially available to the
court would have been to establish the higher standard of protection
within the state as a standard mandated by the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. To employ this solution, the Pennsylvania court would
have had to hold that the right to counsel upon arrest was so funda-
mental that it must be accorded state constitutional protection.
Admittedly, constitutional adjudication is generally thought to be
less flexible than other types of adjudication, such as a supervisory
power solution, but such inflexibility can in many cases be a virtue
rather than a vice. Where fundamental interests are involved, the
law protecting them should necessarily be more rigid and less recep-
tive to impulsive change. Moreover, a state constitutional decision,
being free of Supreme Court review, 9 could provide a more indelible
85. 320 A.2d at 357 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). Justice Pomeroy thought there was merit
in extending the right to counsel beyond Kirby requirements.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 361 (Eagen, J., concurring).
89. The highest state court is the ultimate tribunal to construe the state's constitution
unless the rights of other states or the United States are concerned. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer
v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). Of course, a narrow interpretation of a state constitution in favor
of the state and against the individual defendant would be limited by the minimum guaran-
tees of the supreme law of the land, the United States Constitution.
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protection of fundamental interests than federal constitutional ad-
judication since it would not be influenced by restrictive decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.
There are two separate bases upon which a right can be estab-
lished as a matter of state constitutional law where no such right is
recognized under the Federal Constitution. 0 Logically, a state con-
stitution might contain specific protections, dispositive of the case
at hand, which are not contained within the Federal Constitution.
Where that is not the case, however, the state is left with only the
possibility of construing a similar clause in its constitution as being
different from, or more demanding than, an analogous federal pro-
vision."
The Constitution of Pennsylvania sets out the rights of the ac-
cused in criminal prosecutions in article 1, § 9.52 Among other pro-
tections, the accused is specifically guaranteed: 1) the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses; 2) the right to effective
assistance of counsel; 3) the privilege against self-incrimination;
90. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
91. The New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with a problem similar to that faced by
the Richman court in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). After drafting an
opinion which declared the state's method of raising revenues for school systems as violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and
a similar state constitutional provision, the New Jersey court learned that in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
had rejected such a federal constitutional argument. The court then recognized two alterna-
tives available to reach the same result under the New Jersey Constitution. It acknowledged
that it could construe the state equal protection clause as being more demanding than the
federal equal protection clause, or it could turn the decision on specific state constitutional
provisions which pertained to the matter at hand and which were not contained within the
Federal Constitution. In choosing the latter alternative, the court noted that the state equal
protection clause might become unmanageable if it were called upon to supply answers
categorically in the broad field of human needs. It was not the proper instrument for choosing
those needs that must be met and the sole basis upon which the state was permitted to act.
Since the state constitution provided a specific constitutional right to education, however,
the state court did not need to interpret its equal protection clause as demanding more than
the federal one to establish an equal right to adequate education within the state. 62 N.J. at
490, 492, 501, 303 A.2d at 282, 283, 287. See generally 12 DuQ. L. Rav. 989 (1974).
92. This section provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and
his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself,
nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land.
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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and 4) the protections of due process. 3 Each of these protections
is also substantively guaranteed by a provision in the fifth, sixth
or fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution. Thus, the
Richman court could not have utilized the first suggested analysis
-reliance upon a unique provision of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. 4 However, it could have established the post-arrest right to
counsel by interpreting a state constitutional provision as being
more demanding than the corresponding federal provision.
The implementation of such a solution would have initially in-
volved distinguishing certain similarities in the Pennsylvania and
Federal Constitutions. Under both article 1, § 915 and the sixth
amendment," rights are granted to a defendant only during a "crim-
inal prosecution." Kirby v. Illinois7 gave meaning to that federal
93. Id.
94. At first glance, the Pennsylvania self-incrimination provision may seem different than
the federal self-incrimination provision. The former provides that the accused "cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself." PA. CONST. art 1, § 9. The latter provides that
the accused shall not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The federal self-incrimination privilege has been held to require, on proper exercise of the
privilege, the exclusion of evidence which is of a testimonial or communicative nature, but
not real physical evidence which is not of a testimonial nature. See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910). Using this distinction as a
basis, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), held that the
compulsory body exhibition and voice sample was not violative of Wade's privilege against
self-incrimination.
Since the federal privilege permits a defendant to refuse only to "be a witness against
himself," it is natural to expect that only evidence of a testimonial nature can be excluded
by the invocation of the privilege. However, the Pennsylvania constitutional provision, on its
face at least, would seem to permit the accused to invoke the privilege to exclude all evidence,
testimonial or real, which had been extracted from him involuntarily. In spite of the differ-
ence in language though, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has apparently chosen to
construe the state provision to have the same meaning as the federal provision, and has
employed the testimonial-real evidence distinction in deciding cases brought before it. See
Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (1966); Commonwealth v. San Juan, 129
Pa. Super. 179, 195 A. 433 (1938), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Aljoe, supra.
95. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9. See note 92 supra.
96. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis supplied).
97. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
phrase by holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel does
not accrue until the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings," thereby establishing such initiation as the beginning of
the "criminal prosecution.""8 This Kirby test for the commence-
ment of the prosecution essentially depends upon whether a certain
stage of adversity in criminal proceedings has been reached. Until
that requisite point in time, the inchoate guarantees of the sixth
amendment remain unperfected. If the Kirby definition of "crimi-
nal prosecution" were carried over to determine the applicability of
the article 1, § 9 guarantees, serious limitations would result. Such
guarantees would then attach only after adversary judicial proceed-
ings had been initiated by a magistrate's approval of a written com-
plaint.
The basis for determining the attachment of the state protections
guaranteed during a "criminal prosecution," however, need not be
the same as the federal standard enunciated in Kirby. Indeed, a
strong argument can be made that the applicability of each of these
Pennsylvania constitutional protections should be determined by
the nature of the guarantee and not merely the procedural stage at
which it is invoked. Various rights are granted the accused during
a "criminal prosecution" in Pennsylvania which are not encom-
passed by the sixth amendment. Thus the expanded scope of article
1, § 9 already suggests that a more liberal basis for application may
be necessary. Among these state constitutional protections are the
privilege against self-incrimination and the protections of due pro-
cess. Incorporation of the Kirby stage-of-adversity test to fix one
point at which each of these protections becomes enforceable would
be highly inappropriate. Surely due process is required during every
stage in the criminal proceeding, and it is beyond question that the
state privilege against self-incrimination applies in instances com-
pletely independent of any initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings.9" Thus, the test for application of these two state protections
does not depend on the stage of adversity which has been obtained,
but must relate to the nature and purpose of the protection and the
98. Id. at 689. The Kirby Court felt that "[i]t is this point . .. that marks the com-
mencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment are applicable." Id. at 690.
99. E.g., Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954) (PA. CONST. art.
1, § 9 privilege against self-incrimination applies to proceedings before a grand jury where
"the accused" has been subpoenaed to testify as a witness).
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circumstances under which it is invoked. If that is to be the flexible
test for determining the initiation of these state constitutional guar-
antees, it should logically be the test for all. Consequently, each
claim of state constitutional protection should require a separate
determination of whether a "criminal prosecution" has begun based
upon the nature of the provision in question and the factual setting
before the court.
Such a state constitutional analysis would have given the
Richman court a fresh start in determining the scope of the state
right to counsel at pretrial confrontations. The compelling "critical
stage" rationale of Wade had similary focused on the nature of the
sixth amendment right to counsel in the context of the highly
suggestive lineup situation.00 Freed from the confining effect of
Kirby, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania could have merely reas-
serted the Wade rationale it had found so appealing and established
a right to counsel at post-arrest confrontations as a matter of state
constitutional law.
It might be argued, however, that the protection granted the ac-
cused in Wade was based primarily on a sixth amendment penum-
bra guarantee to a "fair trial," ° rather than the specific guarantee
to the assistance of counsel. If that theory is correct, then in order
to complete the analogy to the federal constitutional analysis in
Wade, the Pennsylvania Constitution would have to be found to
100. After all, isn't that where the emphasis properly lies? To quote the words of Justice
Brennan:
[Tihere inhere in a confrontation for identification conducted after arrest the ident-
ical hazards to a fair trial that inhere in such a confrontation conducted "after the
onset of formal prosecutional proceedings."
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 697-98 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
101. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court declared that
[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of that right is as
much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment-the right of the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and his right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Id. at 226-27 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
It is possible that the Court was only reiterating the concept that fourteenth amendment
due process requires a fair trial; the "fair trial" language might, however, indicate an inten-
tion to breathe into the sixth amendment itself a general right to a "fair trial" through the
cumulative impact of the specific guarantees. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
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include a similar general right to a "fair trial." In Pennsylvania, the
fundamental concept of a fair trial is extracted from the "law of the
land" clause of article 1, § 9 of the state constitution,' °2 which paral-
lels the concept of due process in the Federal Constitution. 3 Since
fourteenth amendment due process per se has never been held to
require the presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations,'10 the
Pennsylvania "law of the land" clause could require counsel at such
lineups only if it were interpreted as being more demanding than
its federal counterpart.
A state court clearly has the power to interpret the provisions of
its state constitution differently from those in the Federal Constitu-
tion.' 5 However, where a provision in both is nearly identical in
form, some legally or socially based justification for distinguishing
the two would undoubtedly be sought. A mere exercise of power
without justification or reason is an empty exercise of that power
which few courts would condone.
One such basis for distinction may be in the traditional dichot-
omy between the roles of the federal and state governments. An
individual is, first of all a citizen of his state, with concomitant
duties and enforceable privileges. The state's constitution was en-
acted for the protection of its own citizens whose traditions and
ideals may differ greatly from those of the United States populace
as a whole. Moreover, the citizens of Pennsylvania certainly ratified
their state constitution with the intention that each provision
should have the full force of law, and to hold that any such provision
is identical with its federal counterpart would render it superfluous
and without substance.'"
102. See Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 338 Pa. 65, 12 A.2d 317 (1940).
103. See Philadelphia Gas Works Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 331 Pa. 321, 1 A.2d 156
(1938); Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Cent. Brewing Co., 141 Pa. Super. 543, 15 A.2d 723 (1940).
104. However, fourteenth amendment due process may in certain overtly suggestive cir-
cumstances require exclusion of a lineup indentification independent of any right to counsel.
See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
105. See note 89 supra.
106. An additional reason for distinguishing identical state and federal constitutional
provisions would lie in the different impact which an interpretation of each would have. While
a federal constitutional decision affects each of the states, a state constitutional decision
affects but one. Concerns that our system of government might become overly federalized
have historically cautioned less activist justices on the Supreme Court to allow the states the
widest latitude in administering their own systems of criminal justice. In order to give each
state that latitude, the states cannot be collectively bound by a federal constitutional decision
more restrictive of state criminal procedures than is absolutely necessary. Such concerns
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It would be particularly appropriate, where the due process pro-
vision of any constitution is concerned, to take into consideration
the different social and legal environments which influenced the
passage of that constitution. Such factors, combined with the tradi-
tional nature of due process as a fluid response to the needs of so-
ciety, 07 would naturally encourage an independent determination of
"due process" within the state.
SUMMARY
During a period of expanding federal constitutional decisions de-
signed to protect the interest of the criminal defendant, state courts
will rarely find cause to establish a higher standard of individual
protection than that required by the United States Supreme Court.
Yet, when a decision is handed down by the Supreme Court which
constricts the broad language of an accepted decision, or when the
state court feels that the Supreme Court has not been vigilant
enough in protecting the rights of the individual, the state court
may choose to establish a higher standard of protection for the
criminal defendant. Should the state court choose to interpret the
existing Supreme Court case law in order to expand that standard
of protection, various difficulties become apparent. Although such
interpretation is ostensibly a mere analysis and application of the
federal rule to the particular state procedures in use, a highly erro-
neous interpretation will likely find general disapproval among the
legal community and may potentially be overruled by the Supreme
Court.
Establishing the higher standard solely as a matter of state law
presents fewer difficulties and is conceptually a sounder solution.
Once the state court has chosen not to defer to the restrictive Su-
preme Court decision in every respect, has analyzed the needs and
exigencies of the situation at hand, and has resolved the question
as to the status of the interests to be protected, an intelligent choice
can be made among rule adoption, supervisory ruling or state con-
stitutional adjudication, each of which could maintain or establish
within the state the higher standard of protection for the individual.
Andrew M. Roman
would not govern a state decision. See Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67
MIcH. L. REv. 249, 257-58 (1968).
107. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-72 (1952).
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